PRESS FREEDOM CAMPAIGN FOR SOMALIA
REPORT
Somalia National
Reconciliation Conference
Nairobi, Kenya
July 2003
INTRODUCTION
More than a
decade after Mogadishu’s implosion and the subsequent death of the
national state, the Somali saga continues. All told, warlord
politics have turned many parts of the country, particularly the
southern regions, into a living hell. Consequently, life
expectancy has declined as dramatically as in some of the AIDS
devastated countries on the continent, and literacy rates and
educational enrollments have plummeted to the lowest in the world.
While this general profile is rightly worrisome, we still need to
disaggregate the reality. For the purpose of these notes, we offer
the press freedom and freedom of expressions campaign in Somalia
National Reconciliation Conference in Mbagathi, Nairobi, Kenya.
Current
Situation In Somalia & The Regional Influence Of Freedom Of Press
In Somaliland
(Northwest Somalia), an indigenously worked out peace prevails and
a modicum of order has been restored. Moreover, incipient
political structures are in place, constitutional politics is
practiced—typified by recent and competitive party-based
presidential elections—a small but growing proportion of children
are in school, and the rhythm of daily material existence and
minimum economic transactions are visible. Despite these
commendable achievements, there are a number of acute challenges
that vitiate the prospect: 1) an exodus of talent; 2) severe
impoverishment; 3) return of the corrupt habits of the old and
dead order, as well as the dominance of the capital, Hargeisa, and
its commensurate socio/political class in all of the major
decisions and privileges; 4) apostasy with regard to the sanctity
of national unity; 5) political appointments that ignore the
public need for a streamlined order, as the recently formed
40-member cabinet demonstrates; and 6) failure, after a decade of
claims, to convince any other state or international organization
to recognize the declaration of secession and new sovereignty.
Northeast (Puntland)
In the initial
self-definition of Puntland (northeast), the people of this region
reaffirmed their commitment to national unity, and continue to do
so. In addition, before 1998, one could observe a degree of
civic-mindedness that manifested itself in consultative politics,
orderly reinvigoration of trade, and a step towards a
rehabilitation of basic social institutions. Disappointingly, what
promise these initial developments had is now enervated by the
onset of a ruthless, personality and militaristic appetite for
exclusive power. This Siyaad Barre syndrome thrives on a strategy
of low intensity but premeditated coercion, sub-clanistic
maneuvers, and disregard for the immediate development needs of
the people of the zone.
Banadir, Bay,
Hiran, Jubba & Shabelle regions
Other regions of
Somalia are in the grip of violent and chaotic contestation.
Mainly driven by brigandish pursuit of spoils and political power,
the cost has been devastating to both local communities and to any
hope of reviving national identity and institutions. The
territories between Mogadishu, Baidoa, Baladweyne and Kismayo are
most affected.
All in all, variable political geography notwithstanding, the
dysfunctionality of the old regime, horrendous though it was,
seems to pale in comparison with the debauchery of warlordism and
the pain of the present.
RECONCILIATION CONFERENCES
Arta, Djibouti,
Since 1991,
thirteen reconciliation conferences to restore peace and national
authority were held. Warlords and factional leaders dominated
eleven of these gatherings, all of which failed to produce
consensus. Each self-appointed warlord was adamant on claiming the
presidency of the country. As a result, most Somalis submitted to
the prospect of not seeing a national state in their lifetime. The
bleakness of the predicament proved so paralyzing that it would
fall to the partially Somali populated small Republic of Djibouti
and its leader to recharge hopes of saving Somalia from itself.
Ismail Omar Geeleh, with the zest that accompanies a new
presidency, coupled with his own primordial affinity with the
Somali people, made a personal assignment of the pressing
necessities of reducing regional instability and Djibouti’s
immediate vulnerabilities.
With his
surprise announcement at the UN General Assembly in 1999 to
convene a different gathering to rebuild Somalia, President Geeleh
put the full energy of his administration behind the endeavor. So
it was that this meeting of Somalis took place in Djibouti in
March 2000. A series of workshops were conducted for a month.
Traditional leaders, businessmen, women, intellectuals, and others
were invited. Most significantly, warlords were also extended a
welcome, but not as veto holders. All in all, nearly 5,000
delegates came from every region to deliberate over the future of
their country. Predictably, most of the more self-important
warlords stayed away; they complained that they were devalued for
not being treated as the preeminent leaders of their respective
communities. In response, the Djibouti hosts reinstated their
welcome as individual participants, equal to the rest and,
therefore, with no aprioristic and privileged roles. While the
Government of Djibouti provided modest facilities and acted as a
fair broker, the key actors were Somali “traditional” leaders and
former politicians. One moment in the proceedings is etched in the
memory of those who were present: negotiations came to a halt when
sharp conflicting interests clashed. Fearful that the whole
conference was in danger of collapse, Geeleh intervened by
appealing to the delegates to consider the collective interest. In
an emotionally charged tone, he pleaded, “Somaliyee ii heeleya
aan idiin heeleye (O Somalis, help me so that I can help
you).” The appeal moved the delegates and broke the logjam.
Afterwards, the key obstacle proved to be the selection of the
official delegates to the conference who, ultimately, were to
choose a new parliament of 245 deputies. The formula for working
out the distribution of the seats was set at dividing the nation
into 4.5 communities. In the meantime, a national transitional
charter was drafted which the delegates approved and the
provisional parliament later adopted. Perhaps the most daunting
task was how to equitably parcel out the parliamentary seats
within each community. This milestone was reached after some
acute wrangling and, subsequently, Somalia’s first
“democratically” selected chamber of deputies was put into
place. Moreover, the chamber proceeded to elect an interim
president from several competing candidates. These developments
took place without notable interference from the Djibouti
Government; and, critical to note, none of the defeated candidates
expressed any doubt that the host government was anything but
impartial. In short, the Arta reconciliation conference brought
achievements that seemed far-fetched only a few months earlier.
The Somali public, on the whole, responded with a conspicuous
sense of relief, elation, and anticipation.
Interim
President Abdiqasim Salad and his entourage made an unplanned
visit to the ruined capital. Despite the chaos, hundreds of
thousands came out to celebrate what they hoped to be the
beginning of a peaceful era. But the promise soon tumbled as the
Transitional National Government (TNG) was hobbled by a
combination of Ethiopian-cum-warlord subversion and the inherent
defects of the new team.
Eldoret, Kenya.
In October 2002,
members of the organization agreed to launch a Somali conference
managed by what came to be dubbed as “frontline states,” comprised
of Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya, the last country acting as
Chair. Under enormous international pressure, the Transitional
National Government (TNG) and the Djibouti Government agreed to
this proposal. Moreover, the TNG assumed the neutrality of Kenya.
The generation of lists representing three groups—i.e., the TNG,
warlords, and civil society—and the appointment of a Kenyan
special envoy, E. Mwangle. The conference commenced in Eldoret,
and political rivalries were there. 23 leaders signed agreement
called cessation of hostilities in Eldoret. As Kenya got new
administration, the president Mwai Kibaki nominated Amb. Bethuel
Kiblagat as his special envoy to Somali peace conference, and
changed former enjoy E. Mwangala.
Mbagathi, Kenya
Previously
serving in senior diplomatic posts as well as top civil servant
positions in Kenya’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador B.
Kiplagat came with a degree of professionalism in a postcolonial
Kenya known for the opposite. This appointment injected a sense of
hope in the proceedings and Somalis expected him to behave as an
honest mediator; one who would correct past misdeeds. Ambassador
Kiplagat moved quickly to restore propriety to the process by
relocating the conference to a cheaper location and housed in a
college rather than in an expensive hotel in Eldoret.
The first real
test came with a contest over the nature of the list of
participants, and the differentiation between legitimate
individuals who represented civic communities and the pirates.
Unfortunately, Ambassador Kiplagat failed to take action, for he
seemed barely knowledgeable of the Somali problem, his superb
diplomatic skills notwithstanding. Such a shortcoming emboldened
those whose project was to have their own instrumentally
advantageous way. Most significantly, the warlords felt ensconced
in their dominant role. But the issue of legitimacy could not be
easily avoided, and Ambassador Kiplagat had to find a way to come
to terms with it. Subsequently, he took the initiative of bringing
forth a list of “traditional leaders” whom he intended to invite
to the conference. This the warlords rejected, demonstrating
pivotal factor such as the degree of power ceded to the warlords,
since the inception of the conference.
As was the first
phase cessation of hostilities, the second phase was the
preparation of the document that the coming shall work on
including the CHARTER.
THE PRESS
FREEDOM CAMPAIGN
Somali
Journalists Network (SOJON) took this press freedom campaign after
its executive committee recognized the need for immediate action
towards freedom of press in Somalia, and it contains two main
parts.
The first part
of this campaign started in Somalia National Reconciliation
Conference in Nairobi Kenya, while The second part is to make the
same campaign in the country but slightly different in activities.
This part is to go to many regions of the country for insuring the
press freedom.
For the
implementation of this movement in Somalia National Reconciliation
Conference, three members of SOJON involved in the peace talks.
OBJECTIVES
OF THE
CAMPAIGN
a) To assure
that no press freedom violations and obstacles in Somalia.
b)
Protecting the press freedom in Somalia as a vital condition for
that freedom.
c)
Persuading deferent parts of Somali society in the peace talks the
sense of press.
d) To
reflect Somali delegates the freedom of expression as a support
for good democratic nation.
TARGET
GROUPS
This assignment
deals with Somali political leaders, members of the international
community and the civil society.
OUTCOMES
The mission
devotes the persuasion of Somali delegates in Nairobi peace
conference the significance of freedom of press in their country,
and the inclusion in the under draft charter of the coming
transitional period of four years an adequate and unambiguous
statement of freedom of press.
ACTIVITIES DONE
May 3, 2003, we
held in Mbagathi, Nairobi, the commemoration of world press
freedom day, which was participated by Somali delegates and IGAD
officers. We reflected them the value of freedom of press in a
country searching good governance, prosperity and sound democracy.
June 29, 2003,
Somali political leaders signed a pledge of freedom of press,
which we arranged for the importance of stopping increasing abuse
against journalists and unpunished crimes against journalists.
Also we met with
the civil society, and requested from them to work with us this
mission and they really pushed with us according to their ability.
Somali
journalists discussed this mission with ITC (IGAD technical
committee), the leaders committee, IGAD Partners forum (IPF) and
Somali delegates, and submitted to all concerned parts the press
freedom clause to be included in the charter.
After these
events, we took copy of the draft charter (version 4.0), and the
freedom of the press of this version reads as follows: the
transitional federal government shall guarantee the freedom of
press and independent media in accordance with the law.
On behalf of the
free press in Somalia, we requested from the concerned parts
mentioned above to include the following clause driven from
Somalia’s 1960 constitution:
QUOTE ART #1
“every person shall have the right to freely express own opinion
in any manner, subject to any limitation, which may be prescribed
by law for the purpose of safeguarding morals and public security”
UNQUOTE.
QUOTE ART#2.
“Expression of opinion may not be subjected to prior authorization
for censorship” UNQUOTE.
After our
suggestions, ITC produced draft Version 5.0 of the transitional
federal government, and says in ARTICLE 28:
FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION AND MEDIA
1. The
transitional federal government shall guarantee the freedom of
press and independent media in accordance with the law.
2. Every person
shall have the right to freely express own opinion in any manner,
subject to any limitation, which may be prescribed by law for the
purpose of safeguarding morals and public security.
After having
seen that great important part of our proposal was taken, we saw
that our mission seems successful. East Africa Media Institute
Somalia Chapter gave us great collaborations.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Somali
Journalists Network (SOJON), getting support from local and
international organizations, should:
1. Plan
workshops of freedom of press to members of the coming parliament.
2. Work
with the minister of constitution & federalization and
constitutional commission that the coming government shall
nominate in its first 90 days for the preparation of a national
constitution that strongly supports freedom of press and freedom
of expressions.
By:
Somali Journalists Network (SOJON)
|
